Published and Forthcoming Articles

  • Bureaucrats under Populism (with Massimo Morelli) (Journal of Public Economics – 2021) (Journal Link) (Ungated Link) (CEPR Discussion Paper 14499)
  • Case Selection and Supreme Court Pivots (with Gleason Judd) (Political Science Research and Methods2020) (Journal Link) (Ungated Link)
  • Delegation and Political Turnover (Journal of Theoretical Politics – 2020(Journal Link)
  • Delegation to an Overconfident Expert (with Scott Ashworth) (Journal of Politics – 2019) (Journal Link)

Working Papers

  • Buying Campaign Investments with Policy Concessions (with Dan Alexander)  (Link) (Under Review)
  • Government Hierarchy, Relational Contracts, and Optimal Electoral Accountability (with Ian Turner and Chris Li) (Link)
  • Policy Bundling and Costly Monitoring (Link)

 Works in Progress

  • Bureaucrats as Lobbyists
  • Electoral Competition with Voting Costs
  • Agency Approval Processes
  • Nationalization of Politics and Delegation