Research

Delegation and Political Turnover (Job Market Paper) (Under Review) (Link)
- Abstract: I study a 2 period game-theoretic delegation model with an uncertain future principal. One principal decides whether to delegate policy making authority in the first stage to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second stage there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the first principal can exploit the uncertainty over the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. This surplus makes the first legislator better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. In addition, I find that policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive. I then show that increased polarization between legislators has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of delegation and on legislator welfare. Finally, as the legislator becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.

Delegation to an Overconfident Expert (with Scott Ashworth) (Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Politics) (Link)
Federalism, Information and Delegation

The Trade-off Between Campaign Contributions and Lobbying (with Dan Alexander)
Why did the 17th Amendment Pass? Theory and Evidence
Political Turnover and Agency Appointments
Delegation, Turnover, and Political Accountability
The Linkage Between Economic Inequality and Political Equality: A Formal Modeling Approach