Research

Delegation and Political Turnover (Link)
- Abstract: I study a 2 period game-theoretic delegation model with an uncertain future principal. One principal decides whether to delegate policy making authority in the first stage to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second stage there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the first principal can exploit the uncertainty over the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. This surplus makes the first legislator better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. In addition, I find that policy stability over time can increase elections become more competitive. I then show that increased polarization between legislators has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of delegation. Finally, as the legislator becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.

Delegation to an Overconfident Expert (with Scott Ashworth) (Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Politics)
Federalism, Information and Delegation

Political Turnover and Agency Choice
The Linkage Between Economic Inequality and Political Equality: A Formal Modeling Approach
States and Horizontal Organizations