Published and Forthcoming Articles

• Bureaucrats under Populism (with Massimo Morelli) (Journal of Public Economics – 2021) (Journal Link) (Ungated Link) (CEPR Discussion Paper 14499)
• Case Selection and Supreme Court Pivots (with Gleason Judd) (Political Science Research and Methods – 2020) (Journal Link) (Ungated Link)
• Delegation and Political Turnover (Journal of Theoretical Politics – 2020) (Journal Link)
• Delegation to an Overconfident Expert (with Scott Ashworth) (Journal of Politics – 2019) (Journal Link)

Working Papers

• Buying Campaign Investments with Policy Concessions (with Dan Alexander)  (Link) (Under Review)
• Government Hierarchy, Relational Contracts, and Optimal Electoral Accountability (with Ian Turner and Chris Li) (Link)
• Policy Bundling and Costly Monitoring (Link)

 Works in Progress

• Bureaucrats as Lobbyists
• Electoral Competition with Voting Costs
• Agency Approval Processes
• Nationalization of Politics and Delegation